sign-cli

Agent-first e-signature MCP server with offline PAdES signing and hash-chained audit.

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What it can do

  • Signer List: List pending local-provider requests where the given signer is a recipient. Pass signer_email to scope; omit to list every pending local request the inbox can see.
  • Signer Fetch Document: Read the unsigned PDF for a local signing request. Requires the per-signer token. If out_path is provided, also writes the file to disk. Records request.signer_fetched_document.
  • Sign: Sign a local signing request as the holder of the given token. Requires --provider local. The token resolves the signer; pre-sign safety checks (require_hash, require_title, require_signer_email

What data it sees

Do you need an account

No: the server works without sign-in

Agent-first e-signature MCP server with offline PAdES signing and hash-chained audit. The same 19 tools / 4 prompts / 12 resources are reachable via stdio (npx @drbaher/sign-cli mcp serve) for local agents and over HTTP for remote ones.

Architectural claim: an LLM agent can drive every step of a contract workflow except the actual signing gesture, which stays gated behind a human via per-signer approval tokens (TTL-bounded, scoped to one email, single-use). Pre-sign safety checks (--require-hash, --require-title, --require-signer-email) throw structured errors before any state mutation — so an agent that computed a hash earlier can refuse to sign if the document was swapped mid-flight.

Highlights:

  • Fully-offline PAdES signer (real PKCS#7, self-issued X.509)
  • Hash-chained audit log with append-only DB triggers + RFC 3161 timestamping
  • Read-only mode (--read-only true) returns FORBIDDEN_READ_ONLY for mutating tools
  • Multi-provider routing (local / Dropbox Sign / DocuSign / SignWell)
  • Pre-sign signature visibility (existingSignatures on every fetch)
  • Tool allow-list + capability scoping for sandboxed agents

This Smithery deployment runs in read-only mode against an ephemeral SQLite that wipes every 4 hours — safe to explore, not for production signing. For local agent use, install via npm i -g @drbaher/sign-cli.

MIT-licensed. No telemetry. Source: github.com/DrBaher/sign-cli. Showcase: cli.drbaher.com.

Server tool list (19)

Raw names from tools/list. Only developers need these.

signer_listList pending local-provider requests where the given signer is a recipient. Pass signer_email to scope; omit to list every pending local request the inbox can see.
signer_fetch_documentRead the unsigned PDF for a local signing request. Requires the per-signer token. If out_path is provided, also writes the file to disk. Records request.signer_fetched_document.
signSign a local signing request as the holder of the given token. Requires --provider local. The token resolves the signer; pre-sign safety checks (require_hash, require_title, require_signer_email) throw with a structured error code before any state mutation.
signer_declineDecline a local signing request as the holder of the given token. Sets status to declined.
request_showReturn the enriched request snapshot: request, approvals (with tokenHint/expiresAt/expired/signed), signedBy[], declinedBy/declineReason, and a nextSteps[] array of suggested commands.
request_statusPoll the provider for the latest status of a request. For dropbox/signwell, reads API keys from DROPBOX_SIGN_API_KEY / SIGNWELL_API_KEY in the server's environment.
audit_verifyVerify the cryptographic audit chain for a request and report any break.
request_watchPoll a request's status until terminal (completed/declined/canceled/timeout). When the MCP client supplies a progressToken, emits notifications/progress on each poll.
pdf_detect_signature_fieldDetect signature-field placement candidates in a PDF (AcroForm /Sig widgets + anchor-text matches). Returns ranked candidates with confidence + adjustment method. Read-only — does not modify the PDF.
pdf_detect_date_fieldDetect date-field placement candidates in a PDF. Returns candidates with `alreadyFilled: true` when a date string is already present near the anchor — callers can skip those when stamping. Read-only.
pdf_inspect_signaturesInspect existing PADES signatures on ANY PDF — ours, Adobe's, DocuSign's, Dropbox Sign's, SignWell's. Returns per-signature signer CN/email, cert subject + issuer, validity window, fingerprint, trust label (self_signed_local | self_signed_other | ca_signed | unknown), message-digest match, and parse warnings. Trust label is structural (issuer vs subject); no chain validation, no expiry check. Pure read — no DB interaction, no audit events.
profile_listList the profiles configured in the user's profiles.json. Shows the active source so the agent knows whether a flag, env var, or default selected the currently-active profile.
profile_showShow the resolved active profile (or a specific user profile by name) with per-field provenance. Credentials are redacted by default; pass show_secrets: true to reveal resolved values. Read-only.
pdf_stamp_textStamp a text string (e.g. a date) onto a PDF. Mirrors `sign pdf stamp-text`. Position via auto_place (true|first|last|all|page:N|index:N) on DATE anchors, or explicit image_page/image_x/image_y/image_width/image_height. By default, candidates whose date appears already filled in are skipped — pass overwrite_filled: true to include them. Writes to out_path and returns the actual stamp positions + quality warnings.
previewStamp a signature image or rendered name onto a PDF as a draft preview — NO PAdES seal, no signing-request state mutation. Mirrors `sign preview`. Returns positions + drawnRects (actual on-page rectangles after preserve-aspect-ratio shrink-to-fit) + warnings.
documentOne-shot DOCX|PDF → signed PDF. Mirrors `sign document`. Orchestrates DOCX→PDF (via docx2pdf-cli) → auto-place detection → stamp + PAdES seal → verify. Uses an isolated temp database so the caller's main db is never touched. Defaults auto_place to 'first'.
signer_reissue_tokenMint a new per-signer token for an existing request; the previous token is invalidated. Use when a signer lost their original token or it's about to expire. Mutating.
audit_scanVerify the audit chain of every request in the local DB (or filtered by provider/status). Returns per-request validity and any chain break. Read-only.
request_receiptExport a cryptographically-signed receipt bundle for a request: audit.json, signed.pdf, manifest.json, manifest.sig (RSA-SHA256 over manifest.json), manifest.cert.pem. Verifiable end-to-end with `sign request verify-receipt`. Mutating (writes to out_dir).