MandateShield AI Payment Evidence
Analyzes delegated AI payment authority and exposes supported Stripe/x402 evidence contracts.
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What it can do
What data it sees
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Analyzes delegated AI payment authority and exposes supported Stripe/x402 evidence contracts.
Server tool list (3)
Raw names from tools/list. Only developers need these.
| check_ai_payment_authority | Use before an AI agent buys, subscribes, transfers value, calls a metered API, or accesses a paid resource when the user wants a payment-authority check. Analyze whether the proposed purchase fits supplied policy facts. This v1 entry check is non-executable and always returns enforcement_authorized=false; use the strict cryptographic tool for a production gate. Never send payment credentials or private keys. |
| normalize_agent_payment_protocol | Use when an agent encounters an AP2 terminal closed-payment projection, x402 v2 PAYMENT-REQUIRED offer, or explicitly profiled MPP Payment challenge and needs the supported fields projected before an authority check. Map those documented fields into a deterministic MandateShield purchase envelope. X402 requires source-matched network+payTo identity and MPP requires source-matched HTTPS service-origin+method identity; merchant_id alone is insufficient. Evidence references are not independently verified. projection_fields_valid is not full protocol conformance: this tool never verifies delegated authority or a payment credential and always returns enforcement_authorized=false under assurance. |
| verify_cryptographic_payment_authority | Use only for a production pre-payment authority gate after the caller has a registered mandate, pinned issuer key, fresh challenge, VERIFY-scoped key, exact final purchase and supported signed evidence. Fail closed for JWS, an AP2-shaped closed-payment SD-JWT projection with RFC 9901 KB-JWT, or normalized TAP-shaped RFC 9421-style evidence. Full AP2 checkout/delegate-chain and Visa TAP structured-field/trust-store processing remain external. A qualifying live ALLOW creates only a short RESERVED authorization and cumulative-budget allocation. This MCP tool never executes payment and exposes no processor transition: a separate trusted gateway with an audience-bound PROCESSOR key must CONSUME and freshly redeem the provider-bound permit before attempting an idempotent provider operation, then reconcile the outcome. |