Enforcer
Identity and authorization in one system: allow, deny, the reason, and a record.
Community: Submitted by a user or imported; check the owner before granting accessOnlineNo sign-inGlobalFreeRead-only
What it can do
What data it sees
Do you need an account
No: the server works without sign-in
Identity and authorization in one system: allow, deny, the reason, and a record.
Server tool list (7)
Raw names from tools/list. Only developers need these.
| getAuthConfig | Public bootstrap for a tenant's login UI: whether this tenant uses native OTP/passkey/SIWE or Privy custom auth, plus the public privy_app_id (never a secret). Call this before getSiweNonce when you do not already know the tenant's auth scheme. tenant_code is a join secret — do not log it or repeat it into a customer-visible channel. |
| getSiweNonce | Public: issue a single-use SIWE nonce for wallet_address (optionally scoped by tenant_code). Embed the nonce in an EIP-4361 message, have the wallet sign it, then call login with provider: siwe. Dedicated SIWE agent auth is an authorized pattern — this is how an agent signs in with a wallet without raw HTTP. Do not log tenant_code. The nonce is not a credential. |
| login | Authenticate and receive an access/refresh token pair. Accepted providers: siwe (message + signature from getSiweNonce — preferred for dedicated agents), email_otp (email + otp from requestOtp), phone_otp (phone + otp from requestSms). Passkey, Privy and SSO are not agent tools. The server does not adopt the minted tokens as the session credential; return them to the operator to set ENFORCER_BEARER_TOKEN. Do not log, quote, or repeat otp codes, signatures, tokens, or tenant_code. Do not paste an end-user OTP into an untrusted chat. |
| refreshToken | Exchange a refresh_token for a new access/refresh pair. 401 invalid_refresh_token if the token is unknown or was already reused (reuse revokes the family); 409 refresh_raced is benign — retry with the client's latest stored token. The server does not adopt the new pair as the session credential. Do not log the refresh token or the minted tokens. |
| register | Create (or idempotently return) an account. Same provider allowlist as login: siwe (message + signature), email_otp (email + otp), phone_otp (phone + otp). Does not issue tokens — call login afterwards to sign in. Passkey / Privy / SSO registration stay out of the agent surface. Do not log otp codes, signatures, or tenant_code. Do not paste an end-user OTP into an untrusted chat. |
| requestOtp | Public: email a one-time login/registration code to `email` (optionally scoped by tenant_code). Always 200 {message:"code sent"} on success. Local/dev deployments with expose_dev_otp may echo the code as `dev_otp` — treat that as a secret. Then call login with provider: email_otp, the same email, and the otp. Intentional for harnesses that cannot SIWE; SIWE remains the preferred dedicated-agent path. Do not log the code, dev_otp, or tenant_code. Do not paste an end-user OTP into an untrusted chat. |
| requestSms | Public: start a Twilio Verify SMS login challenge to `phone`, scoped by tenant_code. 400 if SMS verification is not configured for the tenant or if rate-limited. Then call login with provider: phone_otp, the same phone, and the otp. Intentional for harnesses that cannot SIWE; SIWE remains the preferred dedicated-agent path. Do not log the SMS code or tenant_code. Do not paste an end-user OTP into an untrusted chat. |